ns-judge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python scripts used for testing and mutation that execute other local scripts within the skill package using the
subprocessmodule. - Evidence:
scripts/mutate_prove_ac.pyandscripts/test_prove_ac.pycallsubprocess.runto invoke the coreprove_ac.pylogic using the current Python executable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes Acceptance Criteria (AC) from potentially untrusted external documentation and repository source code to produce a final assessment for the agent.
- Ingestion points:
requirements.md, synthesis files provided via the--ac-fileargument, and various source files within the target repository scanned byscripts/prove_ac.py. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions include a logic gate requiring a
Code Review: Approvedstatus from a separate reviewer skill before proceeding. - Capability inventory: The skill performs extensive file system traversal and reading using
os.walkandpath.read_text. - Sanitization: The
prove_ac.pyscript extracts tokens using regular expressions but does not perform sanitization or filtering of the extracted content before it is processed by the agent's residual reasoning loop.
Audit Metadata