ns-judge

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python scripts used for testing and mutation that execute other local scripts within the skill package using the subprocess module.
  • Evidence: scripts/mutate_prove_ac.py and scripts/test_prove_ac.py call subprocess.run to invoke the core prove_ac.py logic using the current Python executable.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes Acceptance Criteria (AC) from potentially untrusted external documentation and repository source code to produce a final assessment for the agent.
  • Ingestion points: requirements.md, synthesis files provided via the --ac-file argument, and various source files within the target repository scanned by scripts/prove_ac.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions include a logic gate requiring a Code Review: Approved status from a separate reviewer skill before proceeding.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs extensive file system traversal and reading using os.walk and path.read_text.
  • Sanitization: The prove_ac.py script extracts tokens using regular expressions but does not perform sanitization or filtering of the extracted content before it is processed by the agent's residual reasoning loop.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 07:02 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ns-judge