motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes external CLI tools using
subprocess.runandexecFileSync. Tools called includeffmpeg,ffprobe,node,python3, and thehyperframesCLI. These are used for video rendering, metadata extraction, and running validation scripts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates
index.htmlfiles containing JavaScript (GSAP) and executes them using thehyperframesCLI and a headless browser (Puppeteer) to render animation frames. This runtime code generation and execution is a core part of the skill's automation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates the installation of external software packages, including
hyperframes,gsap, andpuppeteer-core, through a separate setup script (setup.py). These dependencies are fetched from public registries (npm, GitHub). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from
captions.jsonandvisuals.json(originating from user transcripts and other agent steps). This data is interpolated into design briefs and executable HTML files, which are then processed by a secondary agent and rendered as code. - Ingestion points: Reads
visuals.json,captions.json, andimages.jsoninscripts/motion.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; transcript text is directly interpolated into markdown briefs and HTML templates without clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system writes, extensive shell command execution (
ffmpeg,node,hyperframes), and execution via a headless browser. - Sanitization: Employs
json.dumpsfor JavaScript interpolation, but lacks specific sanitization for content placed in markdown-formatted design briefs.
Audit Metadata