skills/nexu-io/nexu/deep-research/Gen Agent Trust Hub

deep-research

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from a wide variety of external and untrusted sources, including GitHub Issues, Reddit, Hacker News, and various web pages (L1-L4 sources).
  • Ingestion points: External data is collected in Step 2 ("资料分层与权威锁定") and Step 3 ("事实抽取与证据卡片") of the methodology described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack technical boundary markers or specific prompt-level delimiters to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the researched materials.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses shell commands (tar), file system write operations (~/Downloads/research/), and tool invocations (Search tool, Task tool for agent delegation).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the external content before it is processed into facts and conclusions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The methodology includes a step to package the research results using a shell command.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains the instruction tar -czvf ~/outcome.tar.gz -C ~/Downloads/research <topic>. The <topic> variable is derived from user input, creating a potential command injection surface if the input is not properly sanitized by the agent before shell execution.
  • File System Access: The skill creates a nested directory structure and multiple markdown files under the user's ~/Downloads directory.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Step 6.5 of the methodology instructs the agent to initiate an independent verification process by starting another agent instance.
  • Evidence: "启动独立 Agent(Task 工具)" in SKILL.md indicates the dynamic creation and delegation of tasks to a separate agent process via the platform's Task tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 07:24 AM