oil-motion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto invokeffmpegandffprobefor media processing tasks such as frame extraction, metadata probing, and video encoding across several scripts (scripts/motion_pipeline.py,scripts/compile_scroll_video.py,scripts/media_edges.py). These commands are executed as a list of arguments without spawning a shell, which prevents common command injection vulnerabilities.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Inscripts/production_gate.py, the skill implements a custom YAML loaderUniqueKeyLoaderderived fromyaml.SafeLoader. This implementation is used to securely process configuration files while preventing duplicate key injection, demonstrating adherence to secure coding practices despite the use ofyaml.load.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted external data.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided media files (videos, images) and YAML configuration files (
source/concept-contract.yaml) are processed at runtime by the skill's Python scripts.\n - Boundary markers: While the skill uses structured formats like YAML and JSON, it does not implement specific delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within media metadata.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the file system, execute local subprocesses, and orchestrate complex media transformation pipelines.\n
- Sanitization: The skill performs path resolution and expansion but lacks specific sanitization for metadata or embedded comments within the media files it processes.
Audit Metadata