open-design-landing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the tsx runner to execute local scripts for constructing the landing page and generating image placeholders. It requires file-write permissions to save the generated HTML and asset files to the filesystem.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/imagegen.ts script fetches generated artwork from fal.ai's API. The generated HTML also includes a client-side component that retrieves repository statistics from the GitHub API. These interactions are limited to well-known technology services.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Network operations are present for legitimate tool functionality, specifically for image generation and repository metadata retrieval. No unauthorized sensitive data access or exfiltration patterns were identified.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through the brand brief input. User-supplied text is embedded directly into the generated HTML without sanitization, creating a potential XSS vulnerability.
  • Ingestion points: Data from the brand brief is stored in inputs.json and then processed by the composer script.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or security instructions to separate untrusted data from the HTML template.
  • Capability inventory: file-write is used to create the final index.html artifact.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts/compose.ts renderer does not perform HTML entity escaping on user-supplied strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 5, 2026, 07:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — open-design-landing