open-design-landing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
tsxrunner to execute local scripts for constructing the landing page and generating image placeholders. It requiresfile-writepermissions to save the generated HTML and asset files to the filesystem. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/imagegen.tsscript fetches generated artwork from fal.ai's API. The generated HTML also includes a client-side component that retrieves repository statistics from the GitHub API. These interactions are limited to well-known technology services. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Network operations are present for legitimate tool functionality, specifically for image generation and repository metadata retrieval. No unauthorized sensitive data access or exfiltration patterns were identified.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through the brand brief input. User-supplied text is embedded directly into the generated HTML without sanitization, creating a potential XSS vulnerability.
- Ingestion points: Data from the brand brief is stored in
inputs.jsonand then processed by the composer script. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or security instructions to separate untrusted data from the HTML template.
- Capability inventory:
file-writeis used to create the finalindex.htmlartifact. - Sanitization: Absent. The
scripts/compose.tsrenderer does not perform HTML entity escaping on user-supplied strings.
Audit Metadata