saas-landing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions specify that the "Agent Prompt Guide" section in the external
DESIGN.mdfile overrides the skill's own instructions. This design creates a direct pathway for indirect prompt injection if the design file originates from an untrusted source. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
DESIGN.mdfrom the current working directory before starting the workflow. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundaries, delimiters, or warnings to ignore malicious commands embedded within the external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
file_writecapability to produce the finalindex.htmllanding page. - Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize, escape, or validate the content extracted from the external "Agent Prompt Guide" before it influences the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata