motion-video-to-template
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
nodeinterpreter to measure reference videos and render templates (e.g.,node <hyperframesCli> measure). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is directed to download reference media from user-provided URLs using host tools like
curlorwgetfor local analysis. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain directives that override default interactive behaviors, such as "Work from start to finish without asking questions," prioritizing autonomous completion over human-in-the-loop safety checks.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes and recreates external, untrusted content (videos and links), establishing a surface where instructions embedded in the reference material could potentially influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: User-provided video files and reference URLs (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill contains a directive to "Learn from observable behavior rather than guessing the original author's code" (SKILL.md).
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
node, file system writes to asset and project directories, and use of network download tools. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic is defined for the input media content before processing begins.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The executable tool path (
hyperframesCli) is retrieved dynamically at runtime from external project metadata or MCP resources rather than being statically defined, leading to command execution from a computed location.
Audit Metadata