gitlab-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Jira task titles/descriptions and GitLab MR comments.
- Ingestion points: Jira titles (SKILL.md, Mode C/D logic) and GitLab MR comments (SKILL.md, "review the MR !" section).
- Boundary markers: The skill requires user confirmation for branch name candidates generated from raw Jira titles and for commits after fixing identified issues.
- Capability inventory:
git(branching, committing, pushing),glab(MR creation, commenting, merging). - Sanitization: No explicit automated sanitization of Jira titles is mentioned, though the agent is instructed to parse and trim the content before proposing names to the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitandglabCLI tools extensively to manage the development lifecycle. - Evidence: Commands like
git checkout,git push,glab mr create, andglab mr mergeare used throughout the file. - Context: These are standard and necessary tools for the skill's stated purpose of automating a GitLab workflow.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes several security best practices that mitigate common AI agent risks.
- Secret Prevention: It explicitly forbids committing sensitive files such as
.env, keys, tokens, or passwords. - Attribution Control: It prohibits AI attribution in commits and Merge Requests to maintain repository integrity and adhere to professional coding standards.
- Host Hygiene: It instructs the agent not to write files to global user directories or system locations without explicit user consent, preventing unauthorized persistence or configuration changes.
Audit Metadata