gitlab-flow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Jira task titles/descriptions and GitLab MR comments.
  • Ingestion points: Jira titles (SKILL.md, Mode C/D logic) and GitLab MR comments (SKILL.md, "review the MR !" section).
  • Boundary markers: The skill requires user confirmation for branch name candidates generated from raw Jira titles and for commits after fixing identified issues.
  • Capability inventory: git (branching, committing, pushing), glab (MR creation, commenting, merging).
  • Sanitization: No explicit automated sanitization of Jira titles is mentioned, though the agent is instructed to parse and trim the content before proposing names to the user.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses git and glab CLI tools extensively to manage the development lifecycle.
  • Evidence: Commands like git checkout, git push, glab mr create, and glab mr merge are used throughout the file.
  • Context: These are standard and necessary tools for the skill's stated purpose of automating a GitLab workflow.
  • [SAFE]: The skill includes several security best practices that mitigate common AI agent risks.
  • Secret Prevention: It explicitly forbids committing sensitive files such as .env, keys, tokens, or passwords.
  • Attribution Control: It prohibits AI attribution in commits and Merge Requests to maintain repository integrity and adhere to professional coding standards.
  • Host Hygiene: It instructs the agent not to write files to global user directories or system locations without explicit user consent, preventing unauthorized persistence or configuration changes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 03:25 PM