uhi-consultation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill helps developers build applications that ingest untrusted data from the UHI network, such as hospital catalogs (
on_search) and service terms (on_init). This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the agent were to process these fields without sanitization. - Ingestion points: Catalogs in
on_searchand terms inon_init(documented inreferences/scaffold.mdandreferences/design.md). - Boundary markers: The skill describes structured data fields but does not explicitly instruct the agent to use boundary markers when processing natural language content within those fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides technical documentation and
curlexamples; it does not directly possess filesystem-write or arbitrary command execution capabilities. - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify sanitization or validation rules for natural language fields ingested from external providers.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone and run the 'Header Generation Utility' from the official NHA-ABDM GitHub repository (
https://github.com/NHA-ABDM/UHI/tree/main/header_generator_utility). This is a resource provided by the National Health Authority of India for implementing the UHI protocol. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions for handling Ed25519 signing keys and patient PINs. It includes security best practices, explicitly warning developers to keep private keys in server-side secret storage and to keep PINs in memory only, avoiding databases and logs.
- [OBFUSCATION]: A Base64 string is included in
references/scaffold.mdas a placeholder for an agent's photo in a sample API request. Technical analysis of the decoded content shows it to be benign binary data consistent with an image placeholder.
Audit Metadata