feature-planning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted external files and interpolates it into prompts for subsequent AI actions, creating a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.md,Z01_{feature}_research.md, andZ01_CLARIFY_{feature}_research.mdfrom the local file system. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions state to "Include any constraints, patterns, or forbidden approaches from CLAUDE.md here" directly into the prompt for the planning tool without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
TodoWritefor task tracking and invokes thesuperpowers:writing-plansskill to generate implementation directives and write new files (Z02_*.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested file content is performed before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the execution of other tools and skills based on internal logic.
- Evidence: Explicitly instructs the agent to invoke the
superpowers:writing-plansskill using the Skill tool and provides a customTodoWritecommand to initialize a checklist.
Audit Metadata