skill-downloader

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch content from remote sources using urllib.request and git clone.
  • Evidence found in scripts/download_from_archive.py using urllib.request.urlopen for arbitrary URLs.
  • Evidence found in scripts/download_from_github.py using git clone to retrieve remote repositories.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system commands to handle Git operations.
  • Evidence found in scripts/download_from_github.py using subprocess.run to call git clone and git sparse-checkout.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the internet (GitHub, external archives) and installs it as executable instructions for the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Remote archives (ZIP, TAR.GZ), remote URLs, and GitHub repositories identified in scripts/download_skill.py.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the source code; the skill trusts that the downloaded SKILL.md is safe after checking for the existence of name and description fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (shutil.copytree, shutil.copyfileobj) and execute shell commands (subprocess.run).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or deep security scanning of the downloaded skill content beyond checking YAML frontmatter validity in validate_skill_md.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 02:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-downloader