skill-downloader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch content from remote sources using
urllib.requestandgit clone. - Evidence found in
scripts/download_from_archive.pyusingurllib.request.urlopenfor arbitrary URLs. - Evidence found in
scripts/download_from_github.pyusinggit cloneto retrieve remote repositories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system commands to handle Git operations.
- Evidence found in
scripts/download_from_github.pyusingsubprocess.runto callgit cloneandgit sparse-checkout. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the internet (GitHub, external archives) and installs it as executable instructions for the agent.
- Ingestion points: Remote archives (ZIP, TAR.GZ), remote URLs, and GitHub repositories identified in
scripts/download_skill.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the source code; the skill trusts that the downloaded
SKILL.mdis safe after checking for the existence ofnameanddescriptionfields. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (
shutil.copytree,shutil.copyfileobj) and execute shell commands (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or deep security scanning of the downloaded skill content beyond checking YAML frontmatter validity in
validate_skill_md.
Audit Metadata