second-brain
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs three third-party packages globally from the npm registry:
@steipete/summarize,@tobilu/qmd, andagent-browser. These packages are not from trusted organizations and are installed without version pinning, which introduces potential risk from the software supply chain. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script (
scripts/onboarding.sh) to scaffold the vault and verify environment state. It also invokes thenpmCLI to install global tools and theagent-browser installcommand to set up local dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process raw source documents (clipped web articles or files) into a structured wiki. This workflow processes external, potentially untrusted content through the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: Raw files added to the
raw/directory and processed via the/second-brain-ingestflow (referenced inSKILL.mdandwiki-schema.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the raw source material.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Read,Write,Glob, andGreptools and executes both bundled and downloaded CLI tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization applied to the content extracted from raw source files during the ingestion process.
Audit Metadata