second-brain

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs three third-party packages globally from the npm registry: @steipete/summarize, @tobilu/qmd, and agent-browser. These packages are not from trusted organizations and are installed without version pinning, which introduces potential risk from the software supply chain.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script (scripts/onboarding.sh) to scaffold the vault and verify environment state. It also invokes the npm CLI to install global tools and the agent-browser install command to set up local dependencies.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process raw source documents (clipped web articles or files) into a structured wiki. This workflow processes external, potentially untrusted content through the agent's logic.
  • Ingestion points: Raw files added to the raw/ directory and processed via the /second-brain-ingest flow (referenced in SKILL.md and wiki-schema.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the raw source material.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Read, Write, Glob, and Grep tools and executes both bundled and downloaded CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization applied to the content extracted from raw source files during the ingestion process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — second-brain