epic-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from issue trackers, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: External ticket data including titles, bodies, and acceptance criteria are fetched from GitHub, Jira, or markdown checklists (as described in
SKILL.mdand thereferences/directory).\n - Boundary markers: Prompt templates for sub-agents, such as the
plan-agentandissue-agentinSKILL.md, interpolate this external data directly without using secure delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious commands.\n - Capability inventory: Sub-agents, particularly the
issue-agentdefined inSKILL.md, are granted access to high-privilege tools includingBash,Write,Agent, andSkill, enabling them to execute system commands and modify the repository.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested ticket content before it is passed to the LLM-driven sub-agents.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator and its sub-agents extensively use the
Bashtool (specified in theallowed-toolsofSKILL.md) to perform repository management, git operations, and interaction with command-line interfaces for tracking services like GitHub (gh) and Jira (jira).
Audit Metadata