agent-models
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to use an "unsandboxed shell" to execute
loadout sync --globalbecause the command "needs to write outside ~/wrksp". This is a direct instruction to the AI to bypass platform-enforced security boundaries and workspace restrictions. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill modifies shell initialization files (
.airc.d/claude.zsh,.airc.d/opencode.zsh) and instructs the agent tosource ~/.airc. Modifying shell profiles allows for the insertion of arbitrary commands that execute every time a terminal session is initiated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple system-level commands and external tools, including
loadout,pi,prat, and shell built-ins likesourceandgrepon configuration files. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdcontain a Python snippet that usesimportlib.utilandexec_moduleto dynamically load and execute the skill's ownrank_models.pyscript at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
rank_models.pyscript fetches data from Artificial Analysis and OpenRouter to determine model IDs and intelligence metrics used in configuration updates. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external websites and uses that data to overwrite system configuration and shell profile files.
- Ingestion points: The script
rank_models.pyfetches and parses HTML/JSON payloads fromartificialanalysis.ai/leaderboards/modelsandartificialanalysis.ai/models. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or provide warnings to the agent regarding instructions that might be embedded in the fetched model names or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to shell profiles (
~/.airc.d/), update global loadout settings, and execute shell commands via an unsandboxed environment. - Sanitization: Data processing is limited to regex parsing and JSON extraction; there is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the external data before it is interpolated into shell scripts.
- Ingestion points: The script
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata