davinci-resolve

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/install-bridge.sh script clones a third-party repository from GitHub (https://github.com/samuelgursky/davinci-resolve-mcp) and installs its requirements via pip. This source is not recognized as a trusted organization or vendor.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The bridge/claude_bridge.lua script runs inside DaVinci Resolve and uses dofile() to execute Lua code blocks generated at runtime by the Python client (bridge/resolve_lua_bridge.py). This architecture allows the execution of arbitrary logic within the Resolve environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (scripts/add-media.py and scripts/build.py) dynamically modify the Python sys.path to include directories for importing the bridge modules based on environment-specific paths.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/add-media.py utility utilizes yt-dlp to download content from external URLs (such as YouTube), which introduces potential risks from untrusted web content.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data:
  • Ingestion points: Media metadata from URLs (add-media.py), transcripts (ref-cuts.py), and local project specification files (plan-spec.py).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions embedded within these data sources.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform shell command execution (ffmpeg, yt-dlp) and interface with a professional video editing suite via a custom Lua bridge.
  • Sanitization: While the bridge escapes data for Lua literals, there is no validation to prevent malicious instructional content from influencing the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 06:48 PM