davinci-resolve
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/install-bridge.shscript clones a third-party repository from GitHub (https://github.com/samuelgursky/davinci-resolve-mcp) and installs its requirements viapip. This source is not recognized as a trusted organization or vendor. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
bridge/claude_bridge.luascript runs inside DaVinci Resolve and usesdofile()to execute Lua code blocks generated at runtime by the Python client (bridge/resolve_lua_bridge.py). This architecture allows the execution of arbitrary logic within the Resolve environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
scripts/add-media.pyandscripts/build.py) dynamically modify the Pythonsys.pathto include directories for importing the bridge modules based on environment-specific paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/add-media.pyutility utilizesyt-dlpto download content from external URLs (such as YouTube), which introduces potential risks from untrusted web content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data:
- Ingestion points: Media metadata from URLs (
add-media.py), transcripts (ref-cuts.py), and local project specification files (plan-spec.py). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions embedded within these data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform shell command execution (ffmpeg, yt-dlp) and interface with a professional video editing suite via a custom Lua bridge.
- Sanitization: While the bridge escapes data for Lua literals, there is no validation to prevent malicious instructional content from influencing the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata