edit-style
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/setup/filmcraft-updatescript is designed to fetch release assets and binaries from thestorytold/filmcraftandstorytold/effectcraftrepositories on GitHub. These repositories are not among the trusted vendor or organization lists provided in the security policy. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the download and execution of binary software from unverified external sources via the
gh release downloadcommand and subsequent installation to the local system path. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
scripts/setup/filmcraft-updateutility utilizespkexecorsudo -Ato acquire root privileges for the purpose of installing software to protected system directories such as/optand/usr/local/bin. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A significant number of scripts (e.g.,
build_hook1.py,talk_motion.py,add_music.py,fill_jumpcuts.py) dynamically construct and execute shell commands usingsubprocess.runandsubprocess.Popen. These commands interact withfilmcraft-cli,ffmpeg, andffprobeto manipulate video assets and project files. While intended for automation, this pattern represents a broad attack surface for command injection if input parameters are not strictly validated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading and processing external data, including user-provided script Markdown files and tool-generated ASR transcripts (e.g.,
talking-head-enhanced.words.json). If these files contain malicious instructions, they could potentially influence the AI agent's generation of FilmCraft commands or editing logic, although the immediate impact is mitigated by standard LLM guardrails.
Audit Metadata