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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/setup/filmcraft-update script is designed to fetch release assets and binaries from the storytold/filmcraft and storytold/effectcraft repositories on GitHub. These repositories are not among the trusted vendor or organization lists provided in the security policy.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the download and execution of binary software from unverified external sources via the gh release download command and subsequent installation to the local system path.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The scripts/setup/filmcraft-update utility utilizes pkexec or sudo -A to acquire root privileges for the purpose of installing software to protected system directories such as /opt and /usr/local/bin.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A significant number of scripts (e.g., build_hook1.py, talk_motion.py, add_music.py, fill_jumpcuts.py) dynamically construct and execute shell commands using subprocess.run and subprocess.Popen. These commands interact with filmcraft-cli, ffmpeg, and ffprobe to manipulate video assets and project files. While intended for automation, this pattern represents a broad attack surface for command injection if input parameters are not strictly validated.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading and processing external data, including user-provided script Markdown files and tool-generated ASR transcripts (e.g., talking-head-enhanced.words.json). If these files contain malicious instructions, they could potentially influence the AI agent's generation of FilmCraft commands or editing logic, although the immediate impact is mitigated by standard LLM guardrails.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 05:02 AM