flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with a local CLI tool named
flow(Labflow) and a Python scriptmake.py. It provides extensive instructions for running various subcommands (image, images, batch, generate, upsample) and managing process PIDs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external files including markdown prompt files (
--prompt-file), JSON manifests (flow batch), and image ingredients. While it relies on external Google safety filters (UNSAFE_GENERATION) to catch malicious content, the ingestion of untrusted local file data into command arguments is a known vector. - Ingestion points: Prompt files (
.md), manifest files (.json), and image reference files. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for file content boundaries.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands (
flow,make.py) and local file system reads/writes. - Sanitization: Relies on the underlying Google Flow engine's safety filtering and prompt rejection logic.
- [SAFE]: The skill contains explicit negative constraints preventing the agent from performing high-risk actions. Specifically, it instructs the agent to never expose or request session tokens, cookies, passwords, recovery data, or vault credentials, which mitigates potential data exfiltration of sensitive session information.
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