labflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs users on how to manually extract highly sensitive HttpOnly session cookies (
__Secure-next-auth.session-token) from their browser's developer tools to authenticate the CLI. While the skill includes a warning against printing the token, the manual handling and storage of raw session credentials increases the risk of accidental exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute an "unofficial" CLI tool (
flow). Running unofficial binaries that require full account session access introduces a significant supply chain risk, as the security and data-handling practices of the third-party tool are not verified. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local files and images which are then processed by the agent and passed to the CLI tool. This creates a surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Files passed to the
--prompt-fileargument and images passed via--ingredientinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the content of these external files as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
flow), read local files, and interact with a headed browser session (agent-browser). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content found within the ingested prompt files before they are processed.
Audit Metadata