labflow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs users on how to manually extract highly sensitive HttpOnly session cookies (__Secure-next-auth.session-token) from their browser's developer tools to authenticate the CLI. While the skill includes a warning against printing the token, the manual handling and storage of raw session credentials increases the risk of accidental exposure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute an "unofficial" CLI tool (flow). Running unofficial binaries that require full account session access introduces a significant supply chain risk, as the security and data-handling practices of the third-party tool are not verified.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local files and images which are then processed by the agent and passed to the CLI tool. This creates a surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Files passed to the --prompt-file argument and images passed via --ingredient in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the content of these external files as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (flow), read local files, and interact with a headed browser session (agent-browser).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content found within the ingested prompt files before they are processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 12:55 PM