runbook-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
slack_runbook_handler.pyscript inreferences/automation.mdimplements a runtime execution pattern where local shell scripts are invoked with arguments derived from external HTTP POST requests. - Evidence: The Python script uses
subprocess.runto execute diagnostic and restart scripts, passing user-supplied text as a list of arguments without validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided automation scripts (e.g.,
diagnose-service.sh,safe-restart.sh,check-db-connections.sh) are vulnerable to command injection because they use shell variables directly in commands without quoting. - Evidence: In
diagnose-service.sh, the commandkubectl get pods -n $NAMESPACE -l app=$SERVICEwill undergo shell expansion. If an attacker controls the$SERVICEor$NAMESPACEvariables, they can inject arbitrary shell commands that will be executed by the interpreter when the script runs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from a Slack command interface to perform privileged operations like service restarts and database diagnostics.
- Ingestion points: The
handle_commandfunction inslack_runbook_handler.pyreads data fromrequest.form. - Boundary markers: None identified; the script splits input by whitespace and assumes the resulting tokens are safe for use as script arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes templates for
kubectl(cluster management),psql(database administration),pg_ctl(database promotion), andredis-cli(cache management). - Sanitization: There is no validation or escaping of the arguments before they are passed to the
subprocess.runcall or utilized within the downstream bash scripts.
Audit Metadata