runbook-creator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The slack_runbook_handler.py script in references/automation.md implements a runtime execution pattern where local shell scripts are invoked with arguments derived from external HTTP POST requests.
  • Evidence: The Python script uses subprocess.run to execute diagnostic and restart scripts, passing user-supplied text as a list of arguments without validation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided automation scripts (e.g., diagnose-service.sh, safe-restart.sh, check-db-connections.sh) are vulnerable to command injection because they use shell variables directly in commands without quoting.
  • Evidence: In diagnose-service.sh, the command kubectl get pods -n $NAMESPACE -l app=$SERVICE will undergo shell expansion. If an attacker controls the $SERVICE or $NAMESPACE variables, they can inject arbitrary shell commands that will be executed by the interpreter when the script runs.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from a Slack command interface to perform privileged operations like service restarts and database diagnostics.
  • Ingestion points: The handle_command function in slack_runbook_handler.py reads data from request.form.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the script splits input by whitespace and assumes the resulting tokens are safe for use as script arguments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes templates for kubectl (cluster management), psql (database administration), pg_ctl (database promotion), and redis-cli (cache management).
  • Sanitization: There is no validation or escaping of the arguments before they are passed to the subprocess.run call or utilized within the downstream bash scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 03:35 PM