competitor-content-tracker
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions command the agent to run Python scripts (e.g., Phase 1-3) with arguments derived from user input or external sources (e.g.,
<competitor_blog_url>,<keywords>,<linkedin_url>). This direct interpolation into shell commands presents a significant risk of command injection if the input strings contain shell metacharacters. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documentation explicitly provides a 'Scheduling' section that instructs the user to implement a
cronjob to maintain recurring execution of the skill across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves content from external, third-party sources including arbitrary blog URLs, LinkedIn profile posts, and Twitter/X feeds.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between the skill's own instructions and the potentially malicious data retrieved from external scrapes.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (via the scraper scripts) and the ability to write files to the local system (saving configurations and intelligence reports).
- Sanitization: The skill lacks any defined sanitization, filtering, or validation process for the data ingested from the open web before it is analyzed and synthesized into the final output.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata