competitor-content-tracker

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions command the agent to run Python scripts (e.g., Phase 1-3) with arguments derived from user input or external sources (e.g., <competitor_blog_url>, <keywords>, <linkedin_url>). This direct interpolation into shell commands presents a significant risk of command injection if the input strings contain shell metacharacters.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documentation explicitly provides a 'Scheduling' section that instructs the user to implement a cron job to maintain recurring execution of the skill across sessions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill retrieves content from external, third-party sources including arbitrary blog URLs, LinkedIn profile posts, and Twitter/X feeds.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between the skill's own instructions and the potentially malicious data retrieved from external scrapes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (via the scraper scripts) and the ability to write files to the local system (saving configurations and intelligence reports).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any defined sanitization, filtering, or validation process for the data ingested from the open web before it is analyzed and synthesized into the final output.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 07:12 PM