meeting-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external web searches (LinkedIn, GitHub) and interpolates it into prompts used to generate briefs.
- Ingestion points: Research data retrieved via
scripts/research_person.jsfrom LinkedIn profiles, GitHub repos, and news sites. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
scripts/generate_brief.jslacks clear delimiters or instructions for the AI to ignore instructions embedded within the research data. - Capability inventory: Access to
gmailskill (sending emails),curl(sending to Slack webhooks), andgcalcli(reading calendar data). - Sanitization: The skill performs no escaping or validation of the research data before stringifying it into the prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell heredocs in
scripts/check_calendar.shto dynamically generate and execute Python scripts at runtime for parsing calendar output. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The system relies on executing multiple CLI tools, including
gcalclifor calendar access,gh(GitHub CLI) for profile research, andcurlfor interacting with Slack webhooks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read sensitive information (Google Calendar events and
MEMORY.mdnotes) and transmit it to external endpoints (Gmail and Slack webhooks). While this is the primary stated purpose of the skill, it represents a data transfer of private information to external services.
Audit Metadata