skills/nilecui/skillsbase/nano-banana/Gen Agent Trust Hub

nano-banana

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install and run external code packages (nanobanana-mcp and nano-banana-mcp) from the npm registry using npx. While these are central to the skill's function, they originate from unverified third-party sources and one is attributed to an entity ('ConechoAI') different from the skill author.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup guide involves executing shell commands to add MCP servers to the agent's configuration, which involves downloading and running arbitrary code on the host machine via npx.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Translator Workflow' and the provided tools take natural language briefs and instructions from users to generate image prompts and structured JSON specifications. This creates a surface where malicious instructions hidden in the user-provided data could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Natural language briefs, subject descriptions, and editing instructions processed by the agent in the Translator Workflow and gemini_edit_image tool.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompting guidelines.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes image generation and editing tools (gemini_generate_image, gemini_edit_image) which have access to the local file system (via imagePath) and the Gemini API.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the user input before it is used to construct final prompts or JSON schemas.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 12:09 PM