nano-banana
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install and run external code packages (
nanobanana-mcpandnano-banana-mcp) from the npm registry usingnpx. While these are central to the skill's function, they originate from unverified third-party sources and one is attributed to an entity ('ConechoAI') different from the skill author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup guide involves executing shell commands to add MCP servers to the agent's configuration, which involves downloading and running arbitrary code on the host machine via
npx. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Translator Workflow' and the provided tools take natural language briefs and instructions from users to generate image prompts and structured JSON specifications. This creates a surface where malicious instructions hidden in the user-provided data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Natural language briefs, subject descriptions, and editing instructions processed by the agent in the
Translator Workflowandgemini_edit_imagetool. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompting guidelines.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes image generation and editing tools (
gemini_generate_image,gemini_edit_image) which have access to the local file system (viaimagePath) and the Gemini API. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the user input before it is used to construct final prompts or JSON schemas.
Audit Metadata