worktrees
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands to automate the development environment, including
git worktreefor isolation,docker composefor service orchestration,sedfor modifying configuration files, andkillfor process management. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill performs operations on sensitive environment files that often contain credentials. Evidence:
cp ../../.env* .inapps.mdcopies environment files into worktree subdirectories, duplicating sensitive information like API keys and database passwords across the local filesystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection if used with untrusted codebases.
- Ingestion points: Reads and acts upon files within the repository like
.envandwatch.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent does not distinguish repository data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: High, including file manipulation and arbitrary shell execution.
- Sanitization: None; repository content is executed directly.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires executing local scripts and binaries such as
make tailwindcss,./tailwindcss, and./watch.sh, which can result in code execution if the repository contains malicious versions of these files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup involves downloading external assets during execution. Evidence:
make tailwindcssis described as a step that downloads the Tailwind CSS binary if it is missing from the environment.
Audit Metadata