meeting-prep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill researches individuals and companies by fetching and processing live web data from search engines and specific URLs (e.g., LinkedIn, news sites).
- Ingestion points: Web content retrieved via
nimble searchandnimble extractcommands inSKILL.md(Steps 3, 4, 5). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when processing this external content, which could allow malicious instructions embedded in web pages to influence the agent's briefing synthesis.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for CLI operations andWritecapabilities to modify local memory files. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of external content is defined before interpolation into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes the
Bashtool to execute thenimbleCLI for data retrieval andpython3for runtime date calculations. While these are core functionalities, they represent significant system capabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/profile-and-onboarding.mdfile provides instructions for installing the@nimble-way/nimble-clipackage vianpm. As this is a resource owned by the skill's author (nimbleway), it is documented as a standard vendor dependency. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The onboarding documentation in
references/profile-and-onboarding.mdsuggests that users store theirNIMBLE_API_KEYin plain text within shell configuration files (~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc) to persist the environment variable across sessions.
Audit Metadata