talent-sourcing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted web data by searching and extracting profiles from external platforms like LinkedIn, Indeed, GitHub, and Wellfound, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External candidate data is fetched in
SKILL.md(Step 3 and Step 4) usingnimble searchandnimble extractoperations. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or add defensive prompt instructions to ignore text patterns within the retrieved candidate details.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes wide-reaching capabilities across
SKILL.md, including Bash command execution, file system writes/edits (Write,Edit,mkdir), and the ability to spawn nested sub-agents. - Sanitization: Absent. The markdown text returned from web extractions is parsed directly by the LLM for scoring and ranking without filtering.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: In
SKILL.md(Step 3) andreferences/nimble-playbook.md, the skill mandates spawning sub-agents withmode: "bypassPermissions". This configuration circumvents standard user permission gates for tools within sub-agents, which increases the execution authority granted to background processes and amplifies the potential blast radius if a sub-agent ingests malicious content.
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