patent-writer-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The configuration in
references/mcporter.jsoninstructs the agent to execute code from a remote source vianpx -y @kunihiros/google-patents-mcp. This package originates from a third-party personal scope on the NPM registry and is executed without version pinning, which poses a risk of executing unverified or potentially malicious code. It also fetches theexa-mcp-serverfrom the well-known search service Exa. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's operational logic relies on external software components fetched at runtime or installation, including
mcporterand themarkitdowndocument conversion tool from Microsoft. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied technical materials (DOCX, PDF, Markdown) which may contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Technical disclosure files provided by the user and processed via the
input-parserprompt. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions were identified to isolate the LLM from commands embedded within technical source text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands (
markitdown,bash,mkdir), write to the local file system, and perform network operations via MCP. - Sanitization: No content validation or sanitization is performed on the technical content before it is interpolated into subsequent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands for document processing, such as
markitdown <input-file> -o <output-file>. Using user-provided file names as arguments to shell commands creates a potential injection surface if the execution environment does not strictly sanitize inputs.
Audit Metadata