officecli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides installation instructions that use piped execution to bash and PowerShell (curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash and irm https://d.officecli.ai/install.ps1 | iex). This allows for arbitrary code execution on the host system from a remote, unverified source without auditing the script contents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the officecli tool via shell commands. It frequently interpolates user-controlled data such as file paths and property values into these commands, which could lead to command injection if the agent does not properly escape inputs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8):
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through officecli view <file>, officecli get <file>, and officecli query <file> commands which read content from external Office documents.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed document content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (bash, officecli) and file system operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content extracted from documents before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 08:42 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — officecli