officecli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides installation instructions that use piped execution to bash and PowerShell (
curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bashandirm https://d.officecli.ai/install.ps1 | iex). This allows for arbitrary code execution on the host system from a remote, unverified source without auditing the script contents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
officeclitool via shell commands. It frequently interpolates user-controlled data such as file paths and property values into these commands, which could lead to command injection if the agent does not properly escape inputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
officecli view <file>,officecli get <file>, andofficecli query <file>commands which read content from external Office documents. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
bash,officecli) and file system operations. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content extracted from documents before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata