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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves content through third-party proxy services including
defuddle.mdandr.jina.ai. It also provides instructions for downloading and installing various system and language dependencies such asplaywright,marker-pdf, andpoppler. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/fetch.shscript executesnpx --yes agent-fetch, which downloads and runs a package from the npm registry at runtime. Similarly,scripts/fetch_weixin.pytriggers the installation of the Chromium browser viaplaywright install chromium. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill runs shell and Python scripts to handle document fetching and parsing, passing user-controlled URLs and file paths as arguments to commands like
curl,pdftotext, andnpx. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User-provided URLs, which may contain sensitive or private identifiers, are transmitted to external services (
defuddle.md,r.jina.ai) for the purpose of content conversion. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core functionality of ingesting and rendering arbitrary web content creates an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
fetch.sh,fetch_feishu.py, andfetch_weixin.pywhen processing user-provided URLs or PDFs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the fetched Markdown content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network requests, shell command execution, and writing files to the user's
~/Downloadsdirectory. - Sanitization: Content is parsed into Markdown, which removes active code elements like scripts but does not filter for natural language instructions that could influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata