power-automate-monitoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes metadata from the Power Platform that can be modified by users (makers), creating a surface for indirect instructions to be passed to the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through tools like
list_store_flows,get_store_flow,list_store_makers, andlist_store_power_apps. Fields such asdisplayName,description,tags, andownersare specifically identified as containing user-defined content. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided in the skill to wrap this external content in delimiters or to ignore potential instructions embedded within the metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses write capabilities, including the ability to update governance metadata and notification rules via
update_store_flow, and to change flow states (starting/stopping flows) via the linkedset_live_flow_statetool. - Sanitization: The skill instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for the external content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
Audit Metadata