cicd-pipeline
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's instructions for setting up performance testing in GitHub Actions include shell commands that use
sudoto register GPG keys, modify system repository sources, and install packages viaapt-get. While standard for CI runner environments, these commands facilitate privilege escalation to root during the pipeline execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The provided CI/CD templates reference and download external code from non-trusted community sources, such as the
8398a7/action-slackGitHub Action for Slack notifications. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the download and execution of external software and actions during pipeline runs. This includes fetching the
k6load testing tool from official repositories and utilizing thesnyk/actions/nodesecurity scanning action. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The templates generate extensive shell command sequences using
npx,npm, and direct shell invocation to execute linters, test runners (Jest, Playwright), and database migration tools (Prisma). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by interpolating user-provided project data (such as server hosts, ports, and database URLs) directly into shell-executing templates without explicit sanitization logic or boundary markers. Evidence: Ingestion points via placeholders like
<app-host>and<port>inSKILL.md; lack of sanitization for these interpolated values; capability for the resulting pipeline to execute arbitrary shell logic based on these parameters.
Audit Metadata