a2a-multi-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an orchestration layer that ingests external data, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted input through the /a2a/tasks and /a2a/orchestrate endpoints where natural language task descriptions are provided, and through the discovery of remote agents via discovery.js.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for processed data to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within task descriptions or external agent data.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator (in orchestrator.js) can execute 154 different MCP tools through bridge.js and delegate tasks to remote network endpoints via outbound requests.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of input sanitization, schema validation, or filtering of content received from external agents before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for starting a local Express HTTP server using Node.js to handle task delegation and agent card hosting.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 08:37 AM