algorithm-cultivation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external social media posts and feeds them to an LLM to generate automated engagement, creating a surface for injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests data by browsing home feeds, searching for niche keywords, and visiting influencer profiles as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/browser-scripts.md. - Boundary markers: The provided documentation does not specify the use of boundary markers or specific instructions for the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the ingested tweets.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant automated capabilities including posting replies, creating original posts, following accounts, and liking content via Puppeteer (
src/algorithmBuilder.js). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the LLM (OpenRouter) for content generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on browser-based automation and headless Chrome control to perform its functions.
- The skill documentation instructs users to execute JavaScript code directly in the browser's developer console (
algorithmTrainer.js,thoughtLeaderCultivator.js), which requires access to the user's active authenticated session on x.com. - The automated engagement engine uses Puppeteer to simulate human behavior, including typing, scrolling, and navigating, which involves programmatically controlling browser actions based on external triggers.
Audit Metadata