notifications-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFENO_CODEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [NO_CODE]: The skill references several critical JavaScript files including
src/notificationManager.js,scripts/scrapeNotifications.js,src/welcomeNewFollowers.js, andsrc/engagementLeaderboard.js. None of these files are included in the provided package, meaning the actual logic being executed cannot be audited for malicious behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to scrape and process external, untrusted content from X/Twitter notifications.
- Ingestion points: Data is collected from DOM elements matching
[data-testid="notification"]and[data-testid="notification"] [dir="auto"]as specified in the DOM Selectors table. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts mentioned in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs bulk management, notification scraping, and automated follower engagement (sending welcome messages).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic to handle potentially malicious notification content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation explicitly instructs users to open browser DevTools and paste scripts into the console. This 'Self-XSS' pattern is a significant security risk, as users are guided to bypass platform security controls and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of their active session.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata identifies the author as 'nichxbt', which does not match the expected author context 'nirholas' provided for this analysis, representing a potential discrepancy in identity or ownership.
Audit Metadata