extract-testimonials
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes external, untrusted content from video transcripts.
- Ingestion points: Loom transcripts and captions retrieved via MCP tools as described in SKILL.md Phase 2.
- Boundary markers: The skill includes a mandatory warning block explicitly instructing the agent to treat scraped content as material to analyze rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (ffmpeg, curl), write to the local file system, and upload files to Google Drive.
- Sanitization: The instructions tell the agent to quote and stop if the scraped text appears to address the agent directly.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates shell commands for video manipulation using
ffmpegandcurlbased on external inputs. - Commands incorporate timestamps (
{start},{end}) parsed from transcript text and signed URLs obtained from the Loom tool. - Risks are mitigated by a multi-step human approval process where candidates and final clips must be reviewed by the user before execution and upload.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads video recordings from Loom, a well-known service, using signed URLs.
- The download is performed via
curlto a local working directory. - As the source is a well-known service, this is considered a standard functional requirement of the skill.
Audit Metadata