spy-on-competitor-meta-ads
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
curlto interface with Apify's API for scraping operations and status polling. It also leverages local system utilities includingffmpeg,ffprobe, andwhisper-clito handle video file analysis and transcription tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Video advertisements are downloaded from Meta's content delivery networks to the local
/tmp/ad_videos/directory. These files are processed locally and then deleted once transcription and metadata extraction are complete. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Advertisement metadata, creative URLs, and transcripts are transmitted to the user's Airtable base. This network activity is central to the skill's purpose of maintaining a competitor database and targets well-known service providers.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The classification logic in Step 6 processes untrusted content (ad copy and transcripts) from external sources, which represents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Competitor advertisement text, titles, and generated transcripts from the Meta Ad Library (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when presenting external data for classification.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (curl, ffmpeg) and network communication with Airtable and Apify.
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement explicit sanitization or filtering of the advertisement data before passing it to the model for classification.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to retrieve API tokens from the project's
.mcp.jsonor a.envfile. This approach avoids hardcoding sensitive credentials and adheres to standard security practices for secret management.
Audit Metadata