pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime compilation of a C source file and uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject the resulting shared object library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process. This is designed to facilitate functionality in environments with Unix socket restrictions but utilizes advanced process injection techniques. - Evidence: Found
subprocess.run(["gcc", "-shared", ...])to compile a shim andenv["LD_PRELOAD"] = str(shim)to inject it withinscripts/office/soffice.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PowerPoint (.pptx) files and uses extracted data to drive agent actions, representing an indirect injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted files enter the system via
scripts/office/unpack.pyand themarkitdowntool mentioned inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on standard XML tags and the OpenXML structure as delimiters for extracted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute multiple system commands via
subprocess.run, includingsoffice,pdftoppm,gcc, andgitacross various helper scripts. - Sanitization: The skill uses
defusedxmlandlxmlfor XML parsing, providing protection against common XML-based attacks like entity expansion.
Audit Metadata