apc-orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text through the /apc-orchestrate <goal> command to drive subagent workers. This creates a surface where malicious input could influence the behavior of the orchestrated agents.
  • Ingestion points: User input provided via the <goal> parameter in the SKILL.md description.
  • Boundary markers: There are no visible delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the input text.
  • Capability inventory: Orchestrates parallel workers, verifies results, and integrates data, which are powerful capabilities for an agent to exercise based on untrusted input.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the goal input is present in the skill definition.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to load and follow instructions from a file outside its own directory (../../.agents/workflows/apc-orchestrate.md). This external dependency dictates the entire operational flow ('worker profiles, wave protocol'), meaning the skill's behavior is entirely dependent on the content of that path.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 19, 2026, 01:17 AM