apc-test
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to load instructions from a relative path (
../../.agents/workflows/apc-test.md) that resides outside the skill's dedicated directory. This pattern constitutes dynamic loading of instructions from a computed path, meaning the skill's actual logic and behavior are deferred to an external file not included in the analyzed skill package. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The mechanism of loading external instructions creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, as the agent is instructed to adopt the external file's content as authoritative.
- Ingestion points: The file
SKILL.mdcontains a command to ingest and follow the content of../../.agents/workflows/apc-test.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is explicitly instructed to follow the external file "exactly as written," providing no delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill description implies the agent will perform build verification, DAW (Digital Audio Workstation) checks, and interface with the
pluginvalutility. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of validation, integrity checking, or sanitization of the external file's content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata