skill-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
install.shscript executes several high-impact shell commands includingosacompileto create a macOS application,defaults writeto modify the macOS Dock configuration, andkillall Dockto restart system services. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
open.shscript usesnohupto spawn background processes andcurlto probe local ports, which are used to maintain the local server's lifecycle. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bun.serveto run a TypeScript-based server (server.ts) that performs direct file system operations. It reads from and writes to~/.claude/settings.jsonbased on inputs received via its/api/skillsPOST endpoint. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The local server provides a web interface that lists all files in
~/.claude/skillsand their full descriptions. While bound to127.0.0.1, any local process or website (via CSRF if not carefully guarded, though the server is intended for local use) could potentially interact with this API to read skill metadata or disable security-related skills. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation script attempts to write to
/Applicationsand falls back to~/Applicationsif permissions are insufficient, effectively installing a persistent executable on the user's path.
Audit Metadata