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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow instructs the agent to execute the
pdftoppmshell utility using user-provided input paths. This pattern lacks sanitization guidance, which could allow for arbitrary command injection if filenames contain shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an indirect prompt injection surface. Ingestion points: Content is imported from external PDF or PPTX files during the planning stage. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the generation prompts. Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution and file system writes. Sanitization: No evidence of validation or filtering for extracted document content is provided.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation notes that the skill requires access to sensitive authentication data, including the
~/.codex/auth.jsonfile and various environment variables for API keys such asOPENAI_API_KEY,GOOGLE_API_KEY, andGEMINI_API_KEY.
Audit Metadata