slides-grab-plan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data via
slides-grab import-template --input <path>(local files or templates) andslides-grab import-design <https-url>(external URLs) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses explicit workflow steps and a conversion guide (
references/design-md-to-slides-conversion.md) to map web content to slides, which provides some structural boundaries. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (
slide-outline.md,DESIGN.slides.md) and execute shell commands via theslides-grabCLI. - Sanitization: The workflow includes multiple mandatory human-in-the-loop checkpoints where the user must explicitly approve the style, the design conversion summary, and the final outline.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes an external CLI tool,
slides-grab, to perform operations like importing templates, listing styles, and parsing design files. This assumes the presence and safety of this tool in the execution environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The command
slides-grab import-design <https-url>allows the skill to fetch content from arbitrary HTTPS URLs provided during the planning process.
Audit Metadata