automation-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone an external third-party repository from GitHub (https://github.com/zhexulong/openreverse.git) and run its installation scripts. This introduces unverified code into the execution environment that is not managed by standard package registries.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In cheatsheet.md, the documentation provides commands to install and initialize the OpenReverse toolset (npm run init:agents, npm run install:cua-runtime, npm run install:mitmproxy). Executing these build and installation scripts from a cloned repository constitutes remote code execution of unverified logic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to interact with and process data from untrusted web pages and desktop application UI trees.
  • Ingestion points: Browser snapshots (agent-browser snapshot), accessibility tree readings, and Windows control tree dumps (openreverse uia tree) in SKILL.md and cheatsheet.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses an accessibility tree reference system (@e1, @e2) which provides a level of abstraction between raw DOM content and the agent's actions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Playwright Node API and agent-browser CLI, which have the capability to perform network requests, extract local storage/cookies, and take screenshots.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from target pages before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 10:30 AM