cloud-docker-api-abuse
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for escaping container boundaries to gain host-level root access. It describes using the Docker daemon to mount the host's root filesystem using the
-v /:/hostflag and then usingchrootto gain shell access as the root user. - [PERSISTENCE]: The method includes a step for maintaining long-term access to a compromised host by dropping an SSH public key into the
/root/.ssh/authorized_keysfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Detailed commands are provided for executing high-risk operations, such as running arbitrary containers with host mounts and interacting with the host's storage devices using
fdiskandmountfrom within a privileged container. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions guide the agent to target and read sensitive system files including
/etc/shadow, WindowsNTDSandSAMhives, and credential secrets stored in container environment variables or image layers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted output from remote Docker APIs and local system commands without sanitization. (1. Ingestion points: Docker API response from
curlanddocker psoutput; 2. Boundary markers: Absent; 3. Capability inventory:docker runwith host mounts,chroot, and file system access; 4. Sanitization: None).
Audit Metadata