cloud-container-escape
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill details multiple techniques for breaking out of container isolation, including mounting the host filesystem via the Docker socket (
/var/run/docker.sock) and using therelease_agentcgroup trick to execute commands on the host kernel. It specifically targets 'privileged' containers and those with dangerous capabilities likeCAP_SYS_ADMIN. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides templates for high-risk commands intended to gain host access, such as
docker -H unix://... run -v /:/host ...and usingnsenterto inject into the namespaces of host processes (PID 1). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Instructs the agent to access highly sensitive host-level files and credentials, including
/etc/shadow, SSH private keys, Kubelet configuration files, and cloud provider metadata credentials (IMDS) to facilitate lateral movement. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as a guide that influences agent behavior toward high-risk system operations when specific environment signals (like
/.dockerenv) are detected. - Ingestion points: The instructions in
SKILL.mdare ingested into the agent's context to guide its behavior in containerized environments. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the data as untrusted or to ignore potentially embedded malicious instructions from the container environment.
- Capability inventory: The skill describes the use of
docker,mount,nsenter, and network requests to cloud metadata services. - Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering of the container environment's state is suggested before attempting escalation.
Audit Metadata