cloud-gcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to target and harvest Google Cloud Service Account (SA) keys and tokens. It specifically references the local file
service-account.jsonand the GCP metadata server endpointmetadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/tokenfor token extraction. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions detail how to identify and exploit IAM privilege escalation paths within GCP. It lists specific permissions such as
iam.serviceAccounts.actAs,iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken, andsetIamPolicyas methods to reach "owner" status or run as a higher-privileged service account. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes command-line tools like
gcloudandScoutSuiteto perform enumeration, authentication, and policy manipulation. Example commands includegcloud auth activate-service-accountandgcloud projects get-iam-policy. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Instructions include techniques for identifying and accessing sensitive project information and data from services like Google Cloud Storage (GCS), Cloud SQL, and Secret Manager after obtaining credentials.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from GCP metadata services and tool outputs while maintaining significant capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Metadata server responses, tool outputs (ScoutSuite, gcloud) in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: Command execution via
gcloudandScoutSuite, network access to GCP APIs and metadata endpoints, file reading of service account keys. - Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata