mckinsey-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes potentially untrusted data and renders it as HTML.
- Ingestion points: The
assets/deck_engine.pyscript reads data fromdata.jsonand various_decision_*.jsonfiles to populate slide content. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data files.
- Capability inventory: The
SKILL.mdfile defines access to theBash,Read,Write,Edit, andGlobtools, which are used to execute the deck engine and PDF conversion utilities. - Sanitization: While a basic escape function is used for some fields, the
prose_slideandessay_slidefunctions inassets/deck_engine.pyinterpolate content directly into HTML paragraph tags without sanitization, allowing for potential XSS or instruction injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands for deck generation and quality control.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddetails the usage ofpython3, headless Google Chrome for PDF printing, and utilities such aspdfinfoandpdftoppmvia theBashtool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's HTML output template fetches resources from a well-known external service.
- Evidence: The
renderfunction inassets/deck_engine.pyembeds a stylesheet link tohttps://fonts.googleapis.comto load the 'Inter' font family for the presentation.
Audit Metadata