telegram-formatting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides functional command-line examples using
curlandjqfor file operations. - Instructions include using
curlwith the-F file=@filenameflag to upload data. - Examples use
jqto parse JSON responses and extract specific fields. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes procedures for sending local file content to external, non-trusted domains.
- Target Domains:
https://jpg.wtf/api/upload.phpandhttps://api.pixhost.to/images. These are third-party hosting services not classified as trusted organizations or well-known technology services. - Exfiltration Pattern: The use of
curl -F file=@pathallows the agent to read any local file accessible to it and transmit it over the network to the specified external hosts. - Mitigation Attempts: The skill includes warnings against uploading screenshots with PII, tokens, or internal data, and advises against exposing
delete_urlfields, but these are instructional rather than programmatic safeguards. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a vulnerability surface where an agent could be coerced into exfiltrating sensitive data.
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to process content for Telegram replies, which may involve data from untrusted external sources (e.g., summaries of user-provided links or external reports).
- Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are recommended for the interpolation of data into these upload workflows.
- Capability inventory: The skill combines local file read access with network egress capabilities via the provided
curlcommand patterns inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Relies entirely on the agent's adherence to instructional warnings to avoid uploading sensitive files, which can be bypassed via adversarial prompting.
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