deploy-mobile-apps
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
mobile_release_lib.pyandmobile_release.pyextensively usesubprocess.runto invoke system tools includinggit,gh(GitHub CLI), andflutter. This provides the skill with broad execution capabilities within the local environment to manage worktrees and dependencies. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill implements a guarded merge mechanism in
mobile_release_lib.pythat utilizesgh pr merge --admin. This allows the agent to perform administrative merges that bypass standard repository branch protection rules and mandatory pull request reviews. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to manage and utilize sensitive API tokens.
scripts/codemagic.pyincludes logic in the_keychain_tokenfunction to programmatically retrieve theCODEMAGIC_API_TOKENfrom the macOS login keychain using thesecurity find-generic-passwordcommand. It also accesses this token through environment variables. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external configuration data, creating a potential surface for indirect injection via manipulated repository files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
codemagic.yaml,release-please-config.json, andpubspec.lockdirectly from the managed application repositories usinggit show. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in these configuration files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system, perform git push/merge operations, and interact with the CodeMagic API.
- Sanitization: While the skill parses data using structured formats (JSON/YAML), it lacks specific validation to prevent logical manipulation of the deployment workflow by an attacker with commit access to the development branches.
Audit Metadata