find-ai-consultancy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to automatically scan local configuration files, specifically
.env.localand.envin the current working directory, to extract theSERVICEGRAPH_TOKENcredential. It explicitly tells the agent to use the found token without asking the user for permission. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions require the agent to check shell environment variables (e.g.,
$SERVICEGRAPH_TOKEN) to obtain authentication secrets. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands including
curlfor interacting with the ServiceGraph API andopensslfor generating firm identifiers via SHA-256 hashing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from an external API (
api.servicegraph.co) and integrates it into the agent's context. - Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the
/v1/searchand/v1/getendpoints of the ServiceGraph API as described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard any natural language instructions that might be embedded in the API responses.
- Capability inventory: The agent maintains the ability to execute shell commands (
curl,openssl) and read local filesystem data. - Sanitization: The skill does not provide mechanisms for sanitizing or validating the content returned from the external catalog before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata